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FISCAL POLICY IN A TRACTABLE LIQUIDITY-
CONSTRAINED ECONOMY*
Edouard Challe and Xavier Ragot
We analyse the effects of fiscal expansions when public debt is used as liquidity by the private sector.
Aggregate shocks are introduced into an incomplete-market economy where heterogenous agents
face occasionally binding borrowing constraints and store wealth to smooth out idiosyncratic income
fluctuations. Debt-financed increases in spending facilitate self-insurance by bond holders and may
crowd in private consumption. They also loosen the borrowing constraints faced by firms, thereby
raising labour demand and possibly the real wage. Whether private consumption and wages rise or
fall ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the liquidity and wealth effects that arise following
the shock.
In this article, we analyse the effects of transitory fiscal expansions when public debt is
used as liquidity by the private sector. We conduct this analysis in an incomplete-market
model where agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk and have limited ability
to borrow against future income (i.e. markets are liquidity-constrained in the termi-
nology of Kehoe and Levine (2001) amongst others). Non-Ricardian models of this
type have on occasion been used to analyse the aggregate and welfare effects of public
debt in the steady state (Woodford, 1990; Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).1 To date,
there have been surprisingly few attempts to clarify how such economies respond to
aggregate fiscal shocks. One important contribution is Heathcote (2005), who offers a
quantitative assessment of the effect of tax cuts. In this article, we attempt to char-
acterise analytically and qualitatively the impact and dynamic effects of government
spending shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
The spending shocks of which we analyse the effects have one significant, and
realistic, feature: they are at least partly financed by government bond issues in the
short run, with public debt then gradually reverting to some long-run target value
thanks to future tax increases.2 Note that whether government spending is financed
by taxes or debt does not matter in complete-market, Ricardian economies with
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lump-sum taxation, because households discounted disposable income flows are
identical between alternative modes of government financing. Then, under rea-
sonable assumptions about preferences and technology, the negative wealth effects
associated with transitory spending shocks lead to falls in the demand for both
private consumption and leisure, which in turn produce a drop in the real wage
(Baxter and King, 1993).
The deficit financing of spending shocks can, however, have very different conse-
quences when public debt is used as private liquidity, that is, as a store of value held by
agents for precautionary, or self-insurance, purposes. Starting from a situation in
which liquidity is scarce (in a sense that we specify below), such policies have the side
effect of increasing the stock of assets available in the economy, thereby facilitating
self-insurance by bond holders and effectively relaxing the borrowing constraints faced
by households and firms. As we show, the liquidity effects associated with rising public
debt tend to foster households private consumption demand, along with the labour
demand of borrowing-constrained firms. Whether and when such liquidity effects may
offset wealth effects and thus overturn the predictions of the complete-markets model
regarding the effects of spending shocks on private consumption and wages, is the
central theme of this article.
It is perhaps surprising that the actual impact of our fiscal experiment is still subject
to so much empirical controversy. In particular, the application of different identifi-
cation strategies to US data has either supported the Real Business Cycle prediction of a
fall in private consumption and wages following an increase in public spending (Ramey
and Shapiro, 1998; Ramey, 2009), or come to the opposite conclusion that both
variables actually increase after the shock (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2007),
which latter is consistent with the Old Keynesian model and with a version of the New
Keynesian model endowed with a sufficient number of market imperfections (Gali
et al., 2007). Given this lack of consensus, our goal here is not to take any definitive
position as to whether an adequate fiscal policy model should generate pro or counter-
cyclical responses of those variables to public spending shocks. Rather, we use our
model to illustrate that both outcomes are theoretically possible (and not implausible
quantitatively), depending on the relative strengths of the liquidity and wealth effects
that arise following the shock. As we show, which effect actually dominates crucially
depends on how quickly the fiscal rule followed by the government ensures the
reversion of public debt towards its long-run target following the initial fiscal deficit. If
taxes rise promptly after the increase in public spending, then public debt will not vary
very much and liquidity effects will be weak; in this situation, wealth effects are likely to
be dominant and private consumption and wages will fall. If, on the contrary, the slow
reaction of taxes leads to a substantial growth of public debt in the short and the
medium run, then liquidity effects may be strong enough to dominate wealth effects,
causing private consumption and wages to rise. Overall, temporary increases in public
spending are all the more effective at raising output when the simultaneous response of
taxes is limited.3
3 This latter result is, of course, not inconsistent with the Old Keynesian view about the effectiveness of
fiscal policy (e.g. the textbook Keynesian Cross Model). It is, however, grounded on a very different set of
assumptions here.
274 [ M A R CHTH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
 2010 The Author(s). The Economic Journal  2010 Royal Economic Society
The market incompleteness-cum-borrowing constraint assumption is the only
departure from the frictionless neoclassical model considered here, the other aspects
of our model remain fully standard in a stripped-down form. In contrast to several
recent contributions on the effect of public spending shocks, we thus assume that the
labour and goods markets are perfectly competitive, that both nominal prices and
wages are fully flexible, that utility is separable over time as well as over consumption
and leisure at any point in time, that all agents are utility-maximising, that there are no
externalities associated with public spending and that taxes are lump sum.4 Our model
thus provides an example of an economy wherein the pro-cyclical responses of private
consumption and wages after a fiscal expansion arise from the non-Ricardian nature of
the model alone.
Our model belongs to the growing literature on the consequences of market
incompleteness and borrowing constraints for fiscal policy outcomes. Woodford (1990)
derived the optimal level of steady-state public debt in a deterministic model in which
borrowing-constrained agents hold government bonds for precautionary purposes.
This work was subsequently extended by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) to incorporate
idiosyncratic uncertainty, and then by Floden (2001) to take into account government
transfers. Heathcote (2005) introduced aggregate uncertainty about taxes into this
framework, while our article focuses the effects of aggregate uncertainty about public
spending (for the first time, as far as we are aware). Methodologically, our article is
closest in spirit to Woodford’s in that we derive a tractable equilibrium with limited
agents heterogeneity (despite the presence of uninsurable income shocks), which
allows us to summarise the behaviour of the model by a small-dimensional dynamic
system. While this approach arguably limits the quantitative scope of the model, it has a
number of advantages. One is that the wealth and liquidity effects triggered by fiscal
shocks can be disentangled analytically. Another one is that the model can handle
continuous variations of the fiscal policy variables, so that our theoretical impulse–
response functions can be compared directly with their empirical counterparts, and
notably with the wealth of evidence from recent VAR studies.5 While our focus here is
on the impact of fiscal policy shocks, the construction of a tractable general equilib-
rium model with heterogenous agents may be of interest in other contexts.
Finally, Angeletos and Panousi (2009) recently analysed the effect of changes in
government spending in an incomplete-market economy with idiosyncratic production
risk. There are at least three important differences between their work and ours. First,
they study an economy in which Ricardian equivalence holds, and hence in which there
is no liquidity role for government bonds. Second, they focus on permanent spending
shocks (i.e. changes in the size of the government), whereas our analysis is chiefly
4 Recent fiscal policy models include Ravn et al. (2006), who assume imperfect competition together with
habit formation over individual varieties of the consumption good, Linnemann (2006), who assumes that
consumption and leisure are nonseparable while consumption is an inferior good, Linnemann and Shabert
(2003), who have imperfect competition and sticky nominal prices, and Gali et al. (2007), who combine ad hoc
hand-to-mouth households with imperfect competition and price rigidities in both goods and labour
markets. Papers analysing the effects of distortionary taxation in the neoclassical growth model include
Ludvigson (1996) and Burnside et al. (2004), while Baxter and King (1993) consider the effects of govern-
ment spending shocks when the latter generate external productivity effects.
5 For example, Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al. (2004), Favero and
Giavazzi (2007), Gali et al. (2007), Perotti (2007), Caldara and Kamps (2008), Mountford and Uhlig (2008)
and Ramey (2009).
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motivated by the recent empirical puzzles pertaining to the effect of transitory fiscal
shocks. Third, in their model the wealth effects associated with higher taxes lower
firms labour demand and lead, under standard preferences, to a fall in both wages and
private consumption. While such supply-side effects may arguably be at work after a
permanent increase in public spending, our purpose here is to understand when and
why transitory spending shocks may generate pro-cyclical private consumption, labour
demand and wages.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 presents our general
framework with both liquidity-constrained workers (who face idiosyncratic unem-
ployment risk) and entrepreneurs (who meet project opportunities randomly). It
derives the optimal behaviour of all agents, describes the government budget con-
straint and policies, and spells out the market-clearing conditions in the general case.
Section 2 builds on this framework to construct a tractable equilibrium with liquidity-
constrained workers; it notably discusses the importance of wealth and liquidity ef-
fects in determining the response of aggregates to fiscal shocks, examines their dy-
namic impact via impulse–response analysis, and carries out a number of sensitivity
checks. Section 3 studies the impact of fiscal shocks with liquidity-constrained
entrepreneurs, looking more specifically into how liquidity effects affect entrepre-
neurs labour demand and hence the equilibrium real wage. While much of this
Section abstracts from unemployment risk, it ends by constructing a tractable equi-
librium in which both workers and entrepreneurs interact and jointly determine the
economy-wide demand for liquidity. Section 4 concludes. Some proofs and calcula-
tions appear in a separate Technical Appendix, which is available at the authors
websites or upon request.
1. The Model
The present Section introduces our general set-up with liquidity constraints and
incomplete markets. The specific classes of equilibria on which we shall focus, together
with their associated transmission channels for fiscal shocks, are specified further in
Sections 2 and 3.
1.1. Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived households as well as by a
government, all interacting in perfectly competitive goods, labour and credit markets.
The mass of households is divided into two subclasses, workers and entrepreneurs (think of
the latter as holding entrepreneurial skills that the former do not). Entrepreneurs are
in (exogenous) proportion l 2 [0, 1] in the population. Workers can be employed or
unemployed, while entrepreneurs may run a project or not. More specifically, house-
holds are subject to idiosyncratic (i.e. uncorrelated) changes of status, which are
modelled as follows.
1.1.1. Workers
Workers face unemployment risk: the status of workers in the labour market randomly
switches between employment, a time during which they freely choose their labour
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supply and unemployment, a status during which they are excluded from the labour
market. Every employed worker has a constant probability pe 2 [0,1) of staying
employed in the next period and every unemployed worker stays unemployed in the
next period with probability pu 2 [0,1). From their second period of continuous
unemployment onwards, unemployed workers become home producers and get the
(constant) income j > 0.6
1.1.2. Entrepreneurs
The source of idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs is the random arrival of
project opportunities that require funding. More specifically, entrepreneurs oscillate
between two statuses: they may run a project or not. Entrepreneurs running a project at
time t do not supply labour but have access to a constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function yit þ 1 ¼ l f ;it , where yitþ1 is the number of goods produced by entrepreneur
i at date (t þ 1) resulting from having hired l f ;it units of labour at date t. When they do
not run a project, entrepreneurs rent out labour to the market and, as do workers,
freely choose their labour supply. These project opportunities arrive randomly at the
constant rate (1  h) 2 (0,1], and last for s  1 periods.7
The individual labour–income fluctuations that result from these idiosyncratic
status changes are assumed to be entirely uninsurable (i.e. agents cannot issue assets
contingent on their future employment status and there are no unemployment
benefits). In addition, households face a debt limit that bounds their asset wealth
below at all times. To allow for some, but limited, debt issuance by households, we
follow the literature on limited commitment (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and assume
that only a quantity d  0 of goods is pledgeable to outside lenders, with borrowers
being able to perfectly commit to repay up to d. Denoting by Rt the (riskless) interest
rate between date t and date (t þ 1), this implies that lenders will agree to lend a
maximum amount of d/Rt to any particular borrower at date t, and that the private
bonds resulting from this operation will be perfectly safe – and hence perfect sub-
stitutes for government bonds. This debt limit hampers the ability of households to
use private borrowing and lending to fully insulate individual consumption from
idiosyncratic income fluctuations. However, privately issued assets (i.e. inside
liquidity) compete with government bonds (or outside liquidity) in households
portfolio, and both will facilitate the formation of buffer-stock saving by individual
households in equilibrium.8
The generic budget and non-negativity constraints of a typical household i are
given by:
cit þ ait þ nitwt l f ;it ¼ ait1Rt1 þ ð1 nit  fitÞwt l it þ nit1yit þ ðfit  fit1Þj Tt ; ð1Þ
6 It is analytically simpler, but by no means essential, to assume that home production income is available
after a one-period lag.
7 Our environment generates tractable equilibria when exit from unemployment is stochastic but not when
the length of entrepreneurs projects is. This is because the optimal behaviour of entrepreneurs running a
project involves a Euler equation with interior solution (see (6) below), and hence stochastic length would
asymptotically generate infinitely many entrepreneur types. However, projects can in principle have any finite,
deterministic length.
8 Our definitions of inside versus outside liquidities follows Farhi and Tirole (2009), among others. See
also Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) on these two forms of liquidity supply.
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cit  0; l it  0; l f ;it  0; ait  d=Rt : ð2Þ
In (1)–(2), cit , l
i
t and l
f ;i
t are the consumption demand, labour supply and labour
demand of household i at date t, ait denotes the total quantity of bonds held by
household i at the end of date t, Tt is a (possibly negative) lump-sum tax collected on all
households at date t, and Rt1 is the (riskless) gross interest rate on bonds from date
(t  1) to date t, and wt is the date-t real wage.
nit and f
i
t are two indicator variables that summarise both the occupation and the
status of household i. More specifically, nit ¼ 1 if the household is an entrepreneur
currently running a project and equals zero otherwise, while fit ¼ 1 if the household is
an unemployed worker and is zero otherwise. Indeed, when nit ¼ 1 (and hence fit ¼ 0
since the two occupations are mutually exclusive), the household demands labour
(for a total wage bill wtl
f ;i
t ) but enjoys no labour income (so that ð1 nit  fitÞwtl it ¼ 0);
note also that an entrepreneur who was running a project in the previous period (i.e.
one for whom nit1 ¼ 1) currently enjoys the entrepreneurial income yit . On the other
hand, a worker for whom fit ¼ 1 enjoys no labour income, while one for whom fit ¼ 0
(so that 1 nit  fit ¼ 1) enjoys labour income wt l it (as does an entrepreneur not
running a project). Finally, the term ðfit  fit1Þj summarises the fact that the home
production quantity j is earned from the second period of continuous unemployment
onwards. The inequalities in (2) reflect both the feasibility constraints (i.e., non-
negative consumption levels and labour demands and supplies) and the borrowing
limit faced by all households.
Households are assumed to maximise the following intertemporal utility:
Et
X1
j¼0
b j ½uðctþjÞi  l itþj ; ð3Þ
where b 2 (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and u(c) is a twice continuously
differentiable utility function satisfying u0(c) > 0, u0(0) ¼ 1, u00(c) < 0. Note that
linearity in the disutility of labour is key in the construction of our equilibrium with
limited heterogeneity. As will become clear below, the implied high elasticity of labour
supply means that workers who have just left unemployment and entrepreneurs whose
project has just come to an end are willing to work as much as necessary to
instantaneously replete their precautionary wealth. If this were not the case, the labour
supply and asset holdings of these households would depend on their entire
idiosyncratic history and the number of agent types (and associated Euler equations)
would be very large. We analyse the robustness of our result with respect to this
assumption in Section 2.4 below, where we develop a variant of the model with inelastic
labour supply and partial risk-sharing.
We may now characterise any household i s optimal plans. Let us start with the
intratemporal labour supply choice first. Neither entrepreneurs running a project
nor unemployed workers derive income from supplying labour. Hence, any house-
hold for whom nit ¼ 1 or fit ¼ 1 chooses l it ¼ 0. For those who sell some of their
labour endowment to the market (i.e. employed workers or entrepreneurs not
running a project), (1)–(3) imply that their optimal labour supply is l it satisfying:
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wtu
0ðait1Rt1 þ wtl it þ nit1yit  Tt  ait Þ ¼ 1: ð4Þ
Turning to the intertemporal optimality condition, (1)–(3) imply that the Euler
equation summarising household is optimal asset holdings, ait ; is given by:
u0½ait1Rt1 þ ð1 nit  fitÞwtl it þ nit1yit  Tt  ait  nitwt l f ;it  
bRtEtu
0½ait Rt þ ð1 nit þ 1  fitþ1Þwtþ1l itþ1 þ nit yitþ1 þ fitþ1fitj Ttþ1  aitþ1  nitþ1wtþ1l f ;itþ1;
ð5Þ
with (5) holding with strict inequality if the borrowing constraint is binding (so that
the corner solution ait ¼ d=Rt prevails), and with equality otherwise (in which case
ait > d=Rt is an interior solution).
The last relevant intertemporal choice in our model is that of entrepreneurs cur-
rently running a project (i.e. those for whom fit ¼ fitþ1 ¼ 0 and nit ¼ 1). Indeed, since
their technology involves a production lag, these entrepreneurs trade off current
consumption for current labour demand, which raises future production and con-
sumption. Assuming that this choice is interior (which will always be the case under our
assumed preferences and technology), we find that the optimal labour demand of
entrepreneurs currently running a project, l
f ;i
t , satisfies:
u0ðait1Rt1 þ nit1yit  Tt  ait  wtl f ;it Þ ¼
bw1t Etu
0 aitRt þ ð1 nitþ1Þwtþ1l itþ1 þ l f ;it  Ttþ1  aitþ1  nitþ1wtþ1l f ;itþ1
h i
:
ð6Þ
Comparing (5) and (6), we find that the borrowing constraint will be binding for
these entrepreneurs if and only if:
1=wt > Rt : ð7Þ
The interpretation of inequality (7) is straightforward. For entrepreneurs running
a project and given the production function yit ¼ l f ;it1, any unit of funds used to
raise labour inputs today will generate a payoff of 1/wt in the next period. On the
other hand, any unit of funds invested in bonds will yield Rt in the next period. Such
entrepreneurs are borrowing-constrained if they never wish to hold assets but instead
would like to borrow as much as possible and to invest the borrowed funds in their own
project (up to the point where the borrowing limit is reached). For this to be the case, the
unit return on investing in the projectmust be higher than the unit borrowing cost, that is
1/wt > Rt.
1.2. Government
Let Gt and Tt denote government consumption and lump-sum taxes during period t,
respectively, and Bt the stock of public debt at the end of period t. The government
faces the budget constraint:
Bt1Rt1 þ Gt ¼ Bt þ Tt : ð8Þ
In (8), we think of transitory variations in Gt as being exogenously chosen by the
government, of Bt as adjusting endogenously over time depending on the primary
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deficit and the equilibrium interest rate, and of Tt as obeying a fiscal rule with feedback
from macroeconomic and/or fiscal variables. Following the observation by Bohn
(1998) that the US debt–GDP ratio is stationary, we restrict our attention to rules
ensuring that public debt reverts towards its (exogenous) long-run target B, at least
asymptotically. Such rules, which exclude Ponzi schemes, are consistent with a wide
variety of feedback mechanisms, including ones linking public debt to primary deficit
as in Bohn (1998), output and debt to structural deficits (Gali and Perotti, 2003), as
well as public debt and public spending to taxes (Gali et al., 2007). Loosely speaking,
stationarity requires that the tax feedback be sufficiently strong never to allow public
debt to drift away from target forever.
Later on we shall illustrate the dynamics of the model in the context of a specific
class of a fiscal rule and a shock process that satisfy this stationarity requirement. While
our main focus is on the effects of government spending shocks, we will also study the
impact of tax cuts, both for the sake of completeness and to compare the effectiveness
of the two policies. The fiscal rule and shock processes that we consider are as follows:
Tt ¼ T þ /ðBt  BÞ  T ct ; ð9Þ
Gt ¼ wGt1 þ 1;t ; T ct ¼ vT ct1 þ 2;t ; ð10Þ
where T denotes steady-state taxes, B steady-state public debt (i.e. the long-run target),
/ > 0 and (w, v) 2 (0,1)2 constant parameters, Tct a transitory tax cut variable, and
1,t and 2,t are innovations to public spending and tax cuts, respectively. Note that the
qualitative properties of the model are robust to the inclusion of other feedbacks in (9)
(e.g. from Gt to Tt), as well as to a lagged (rather than simultaneous) reaction of taxes
to public debt. What matters for our results is the possibility that fiscal shocks may
entail significant variations in the stock of public debt, at least in the short run.
Public debt will remain stationary as long as the policy parameter / in (9) is suffi-
ciently large.9 Provided that this is the case, / effectively indexes the way in which fiscal
expansions are financed at various horizons. If / is large, taxes rise quickly following a
fiscal expansion, and public debt plays a relatively minor role in their short-run
financing. Smaller values of /, on the contrary, imply a muted short-run response of
taxes and a more substantial role for public debt issuance in the short run; the ensuing
rise in the stock of public debt then eventually triggers a rise in taxes in the medium run
until the reversion of the public debt has been completed. Finally, the assumption that
steady-state government consumption is zero in (10) is made for expositional clarity and
entails no loss of generality; here it implies that in the steady state, tax revenues only just
cover interest rate payments on public debt, that is T ¼ B(R  1).10
1.3. Market Clearing
There are two assets in the economy, public and private bonds and, as explained above,
the two are perfect substitutes here. Then, denoting as Ftð~a; f; nÞ, with ~a 2 ½d=Rt ;þ1Þ
9 For example, inequality (33) below ensures stationarity in the particular case where l ¼ d ¼ 0.
10 The non-Ricardian nature of the model implies that R  1 may be negative if steady-state public debt,
B, is sufficiently low. In this case, the steady-state tax collection becomes a positive transfer of amount T (the
bounds on R and the relation between R and B are detailed in Appendix A.1).
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and (f,n) 2 f0,1g  f0,1g, the measure at date t of agents with beginning-of-period
asset wealth ~a and with current status summarised by (f,n), clearing of the bonds
market requires that:11
X
ðf;nÞ2f0;1g2
Z þ1
d=Rt
atdFtð~a; f; nÞ ¼ Bt : ð11Þ
This equality states that the sum of the bonds held by all agents at the end of date t
adds up to the amount of public debt. Note that equation (11) reflects the funda-
mental difference between inside and outside liquidity from the point of view of the
private sector. Namely, privately issued assets enter individual wealth (i.e. at), but their
quantity sums to zero since the private sector both issues and buys them. In contrast,
government bonds are bought but not issued by the private sector. Thus, in the
aggregate the private sector holds a net quantity of assets Bt.
Similarly, the labour market clears when total labour demand equals supply, that is,
X
ðf;nÞ2f0;1g2
Z þ1
d=Rt
ltdFtð~a; f; nÞ ¼
X
ðf;nÞ2f0;1g2
Z þ1
d=Rt
l
f
t dFtð~a; f; nÞ  Lt : ð12Þ
Finally, denoting by Yt aggregate output, the goods market clears if and only if:
X
ðf;nÞ2f0;1g2
Z þ1
d=Rt
ctdFtð~a; f; nÞ þ Gt ¼ Yt : ð13Þ
We may now define an equilibrium of our economy as a set of individual consumption
levels, fcig1t ¼ 0, individual labour supplies and demands, fl it ; l f ;it g1t ¼ 0, individual bond
holdings, faitg1t ¼ 0, and aggregate variables, fLt ;Yt ;Bt ;Rt ;wtg1t ¼ 0 such that the optimality
conditions (4)–(6) and the market-clearing conditions (11)–(13) hold for every agent
and in every period, given the forcing sequence fGtg1t ¼ 0 and a fiscal rule for Tt that
ensures the stationarity of public debt.
1.4. Limited-heterogeneity Equilibria
In general, uninsurable income uncertainty of the kind assumed here generates a very
large number of household types, due to the dependence of current decisions on the
household’s entire history of individual shocks, and the distribution of types must be
approximated numerically (Aiyagari, 1994; Heathcote, 2005). Here we focus on
particular class of equilibria with a limited number of household types and a finite-state
wealth distribution, allowing us to derive the model’s dynamics in closed form. We
construct these equilibria using a simple guess and verify method based on two
conjectures, and then derive sufficient conditions for both conjectures to hold in
equilibrium once all their behavioural and market-clearing implications have been
worked out. As stated in Propositions 1 and 2 below, the sufficient conditions for both
11 This formulation of the market-clearing conditions anticipates the recursive nature of our limited-
heterogeneity equilibria, in which these conditions take very simple forms. See Heathcote (2005) for a
general, non-recursive formulation.
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conjectures to hold are that public debt trend-revert towards a sufficiently low long-run
target and that deviations of public debt from target be of limited magnitude.
The first conjecture (C1) is that the borrowing constraint is always binding for both
unemployed workers and entrepreneurs who run a project. This is because the former
expect to leave unemployment with positive probability in the next period, while the
latter gather output from their current investment in the next period. Hence, both
types face a rising income profile and, in the equilibria that we consider, exhaust the
debt limit d/Rt (i.e. they would like to extend borrowing beyond d/Rt but are prevented
from doing so). The second conjecture (C2) is that the borrowing constraint is never
binding for labour-supplying households, which is to say, employed workers and
entrepreneurs not currently running a project. This is because the former contemplate
and, hence, self-insure against the possibility of falling into unemployment, while the
latter hoard assets for future potential investment opportunities. In consequence, these
households are willing to end the current period with non-negative asset wealth and
hence to buy both government bonds and the assets issued by borrowing-constrained
households. As we illustrate in the next Sections, conjectures C1–C2 together with the
utility function (3) generically imply the existence of equilibria with finite-state, cross-
sectional wealth distributions and hence with a finite number of agent types.
2. Fiscal Policy Shocks with Liquidity-constrained Workers
In the present Section, we focus on the case where the only source of idiosyncratic
uncertainty in the economy consists of unemployment risk. Consequently, we shut
down the entrepreneurial sector (i.e. l ¼ 0) and instead endow the economy with an
external firm sector producing output with constant returns-to-scale technology Yt ¼ Lt
(so that wt ¼ 1 8t). We first determine households individual consumption, labour
supply and asset holding rules under conjectures C1–C2 (Section 2.1). We then
characterise the equilibrium that results from these rules and provide an existence
proposition for our limited-heterogeneity equilibrium (Section 2.2). Our next step is to
derive the aggregate dynamics of the model under a number of specifications, high-
lighting in each case the central role of the dynamic liquidity effects triggered by fiscal
shocks (Section 2.3). Finally, we study a variant of the model which enables us to study
how the elasticity of labour supply affects equilibrium outcomes (Section 2.5).
2.1. Agent Types
Consider first the consumption level of a worker who is unemployed both in the
previous and the current period (and call this worker a uu worker). Under conjecture
C1, this worker left the previous period with asset wealth d/Rt1. At the end of the
current period, this worker will have earned the home production income j, repaid
d[¼(d/Rt1)  Rt1] to the lenders and, again by conjecture C1, renewed his debt up
to the amount d/Rt. We thus have:
uu : cuut ¼ j dþ d=Rt  Tt : ð14Þ
Now consider the consumption level of a worker who is falling into unemployment in
the current period. By definition this worker was employed and, thus, unconstrained
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under C2, in the previous period but is currently constrained under C1. Thus, for this
worker (1) gives:
ðfit1; fitÞ ¼ ð0; 1Þ ) cit ¼ ait1Rt1  Tt þ d=Rt ; ð15Þ
where ait1 is worker is bond holdings inherited from the previous period and
d/Rt (¼ ait ) this worker’s current debt. From (1)–(3), the intratemporal optimality
condition for any employed household i imposes that the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption be equal to the real wage, so that we obtain:
fit ¼ 0) cit ¼ ce ¼ u01ð1Þ: ð16Þ
Any employed household stays employed in the next period with probability pe and
falls into unemployment with probability 1  pe. Conjecture C2 implies that employed
households consumption-savings plans are interior (i.e. ait > 0 if n
i
t ¼ 1) and, from
(3), (15) and (16), that these plans obey the following Euler equation:
1 ¼ bpeRt þ bð1 peÞRtEtu0ðait Rt  Ttþ1 þ d=Rtþ1Þ: ð17Þ
The left-hand side of (17) is the current marginal utility of an employed household,
u0(ce) ¼ 1. The first part of the right-hand side of (17) is the discounted utility of a
marginal unit of savings if the household stays employed in the next period (in which
case u0ðcitþ1Þ ¼ u0ðceÞ ¼ 1), while the second part is the marginal utility of the same
unit when the household falls into unemployment in the next period (i.e. becomes
unemployed, liquidates assets and, from (15), enjoys marginal utility u0ðcitþ1Þ ¼
u0ðaitRt  Ttþ1 þ d=Rtþ1ÞÞ.
In (17), household is current asset demand only depends on aggregate variables (Rt
and Tt). The solution a
i
t to (17) is thus identical across employed households, and we
can write:
fit ¼ 0) ait ¼ aet ð> 0Þ 8i: ð18Þ
Equations (15) and (18) imply that workers currently falling into unemployment have
identical asset holdings and consumption levels, so that we can write:
eu : ceut ¼ aet1Rt1  Tt þ d=Rt : ð19Þ
Employed workers can be of two different types, depending on whether or not they
were employed in the previous period. Call the former ee workers and the latter ue
workers. In the current period, ue workers consume ce and save aet . Moreover, since they
were borrowing-constrained at date (t  1) (by conjecture C1) and thus ended the
previous period with debt d/Rt1, they must repay d in the current period. Then, (1),
(16) and (18) yield the labour supply of ue workers, l uet (which is homogenous across
such households) as the residual of the following equation:
ue : ce þ aet ¼ l uet  Tt  d: ð20Þ
On the other hand, ee households consume ce, save aet , and enjoy the asset payoff
aet1Rt1. This also uniquely defines their labour supply, l
ee
t ; through the equation:
ee : ce þ aet ¼ aet1Rt1 þ l eet  Tt : ð21Þ
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To summarise, C1 and C2 imply that workers can be of four different types only
(with budget constraints (14) and (19)–(21)), while the equilibrium wealth distri-
bution is two-state (i.e. ait ¼ aet > 0 or d/Rt  0). Note that it is almost sure,
asymptotically, that any two randomly chosen workers have different individual
income histories, due to the idiosyncratic nature of unemployment shocks. Never-
theless, under our conjectures workers heterogeneity is limited by the fact that only
last period’s and current idiosyncratic shocks matter in determining workers types.
This is because, under C1 and C2, workers falling into unemployment all liquidate
their asset wealth and borrow d/Rt and workers leaving unemployment adjust labour
supply so as to reach their target level of precautionary wealth, aet , instantaneously.
12
Given the assumed probabilities of changing employment status, the invariant pro-
portions of each type of worker are:
xee ¼ p
eð1 puÞ
2 pe  pu ;x
eu ¼ xue ¼ ð1 p
eÞð1 puÞ
2 pe  pu and x
uu ¼ p
uð1 peÞ
2 pe  pu ; ð22Þ
and we denote the asymptotic unemployment rate by X ¼ xuu þ xeu ¼ (1  pe)/
(2  pe  pu). For simplicity, we assume that the proportion of each type of worker is at
the invariant distribution level from t ¼ 0 onwards (so that X is the unemployment rate
at all dates).
2.2. Equilibrium
In our economy, only employed workers hold bonds, which are issued both by the
government (to the amount Bt) and by the unemployed (for a total amount d/Rt  X).
Given the distribution of workers types, the bond, labour and goods markets clearing
conditions (11)–(13) become:
ð1 XÞaet  Xd=Rt ¼ Bt ; ð23Þ
xee l eet þ xue luet ¼ Lt ; ð24Þ
ð1 XÞce þ xeuceut þ xuuðcuut  jÞ þ Gt ¼ Yt ; ð25Þ
where in (25) Yt( ¼ Lt) is production by the outside firm sector and Yt þ xuuj is total
output. Substituting (8), (16) and (23) into the Euler equation (17), we may write the
relation between the interest rate and fiscal variables as follows:
1 ¼ bRt pe þ ð1 peÞEtu0 Btþ1  Gtþ1 þ XTtþ1
1 X þ d
X
1 Xþ
1
Rtþ1
   
: ð26Þ
Note that when pe ! 1 idiosyncratic uncertainty about labour income vanishes; the
model then behaves in the same way as a (frictionless) Real Business Cycle model and
12 In reality individual asset depletion and repletion following changes in labour income are gradual rather
than immediate. Our focus on a tractable analysis of aggregate fiscal shocks under incomplete markets and
agents heterogeneity requires that we abstract from this inertia in individual asset adjustments, except in
Section 2.4 below where we analyse this issue explicitly. Of course, the individual wealth target itself, aet ; will
vary over time following fiscal policy shocks.
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Rt ! 1/b, the gross rate of time preference. We may now state the following existence
proposition (see Appendix A.1 in Challe and Ragot (2010), for the proof).
Proposition 1. Assume that
(i) r(c)  cu00(c)/u0(c)  1,
(ii) pu is small,
(iii) fluctuations of Bt around its steady-state value B are small and
(iv) (B, d) jointly satisfy:
0 < B þ bd < R  ð1 XÞbu
01ð1Þ
ð1 XÞbþ X :
Then, the equilibrium with four worker types exists and has an interest rate Rt that is strictly lower
than 1/b for all t.
In short, Proposition 1 indicates that our economy is liquidity-constrained if the
stocks of public debt, as given by B in the steady state, and private debt, as indexed by d,
are both sufficiently low. In this case, the equilibrium interest rate is also low (relative to
that prevailing in an unconstrained economy), due to the precautionary demand for
bonds by high-income workers.13 From here on, we shall proceed under the assump-
tion that bonds are in limited supply at all dates, that is, conditions (iii) and (iv) in
Proposition 1 always hold, and we will make sure in our calibration exercises that pu is
sufficiently small for unemployed workers to be constrained so that the condition (ii)
also holds. Finally, condition (i) is part of our set of sufficient conditions for the
existence of a unique steady state but it may be relaxed for particular ranges of
parameters without compromising steady-state uniqueness. We illustrate this point
below by performing sensitivity analysis with respect to r(c).
2.3. Liquidity Versus Wealth Effects of Fiscal Expansions
In this Section we begin by demonstrating how liquidity and wealth effects compete in
determining the overall response of aggregate and individual-level variables to fiscal
shocks, and then illustrate the implied dynamic effects of these shocks under the fiscal
rule (9).
Total consumption by employed households is (1  X)ce, while the total consumption
of unemployed households is Xcut . Then, using (8), (19) and (23) and rearranging,
total private consumption and total output may be written respectively as:
Ct ¼ Wþ ð1 peÞðBt  GtÞ þ !Tt þ XdR1t ; ð27Þ
Yt ¼ Wþ ð1 peÞBt þ peGt þ !Tt þ XdR1t ; ð28Þ
whereW  (1X)ce þ X[(1  pe  pu)d þ puj] and!  X(1  pe  pu) are constants.
These static, reduced-form equations provide a first insight into how liquidity effects
alter the transmission of fiscal shock relative to that at work in the complete-markets
13 These properties essentially parallel those obtained by Woodford (1990) within a liquidity-constrained
economy without inside liquidity and in which both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainties are shut down.
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model. To illustrate this point in the simplest possible manner, let us assume that d ¼ 0
here and consider the following three prototypical fiscal experiments. Henceforth, we
shall use hatted variables to denote level-deviations from the steady state (e.g.,
B^ ¼ Bt  B), and we will assume that all variables are at their steady-state values before
the policy shock.
Fully debt-financed spending shock. Imagine first the effect of a purely transitory rise
in public spending occurring at date t (of size Gt > 0) that is entirely financed by public
debt (so that T^t ¼ 0 and B^t ¼ Gt), the implied increase in taxes necessary to satisfy the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint being left to some future periods. For
concreteness, let us assume that this increase in taxes will take place only two periods
after the policy change and will allow public debt to return to its steady state-level B at
the end of date t þ 2 (i.e. T^tþ1 ¼ 0 and T^t þ 2 > 0 such that B^tþ2 ¼ 0). Equation (27)
indicates that total private consumption does not change on impact (i.e. C^t ¼ 0), while
by (28) Y^t ¼ Gt . Now looking one period ahead: by assumption, G^tþ1 ¼ 0 while
T^tþ1 ¼ 0, which in turn implies that C^tþ1 ¼ ð1 peÞB^tþ1. Then, using the government
budget constraint (8) at dates t and t þ 1, we obtain:
C^tþ1 ¼ ð1 peÞðBtRt  BRÞ ¼ ð1 peÞðBR^t þ RtGtÞ:
Hence, unless the interest rate falls so much at the time of the policy impulse that the
stock of public debt actually decreases, this policy generates a boom in private con-
sumption one period after the shock. As we discuss later on, the crowding in of private
consumption by government spending occurs under much more realistic fiscal rules
and policy changes. What is crucial here is the fact that public debt, which affects the
stock of aggregate liquidity, is allowed to increase following the policy change; this
increase raises the consumption level that agents hit by a bad idiosyncratic income
shock can achieve and, hence, raises aggregate consumption. The central role of public
debt in this transmission channel is best understood when we look at the opposite
situation of a full tax financing of the spending shock.
Fully tax-financed spending shock. Take exactly the same transitory increase in public
spending, but assume instead that it is entirely financed by taxes (i.e. T^t ¼ Gt and
B^t ¼ 0), so that public debt never leaves its steady-state value. From (27), we have that
C^t ¼ ð!þ pe  1ÞGtð< 0Þ;
with Ct returning to its steady-state value from date t þ 1 onwards. Hence, this policy
triggers a drop in total private consumption. The cause of this decline is that such a
policy does not change the aggregate amount of liquidity in the economy and, hence,
leaves workers self-insurance possibilities unaffected. Consequently, the usual wealth
effects dominate and lead to private consumption being crowded out by public
spending – as in the baseline Real Business Cycle model.
Change in the timing of taxes. Finally, consider the textbook Ricardian experiment of
a debt-financed cut in lump-sum taxes, financed by future tax increases, with the entire
path of government consumption remaining at zero (so that Ct ¼ Yt for all t). Again,
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for concreteness assume that this policy takes place at date t (i.e. B^t ¼ T^t) and that
taxes will rise in the next period to ensure the reversion of public debt towards its
steady state level (i.e. T^tþ1 > 0 such that B^tþ1 ¼ 0). From (27)–(28), we have
C^t ¼ ð1 pe  !ÞB^tð> 0Þ;
so that the tax cut raises private consumption and output on impact. (Recall that this
experiment would be neutral under Ricardian equivalence.) As we discuss further
below, tax cuts leading to a persistently high stock of public debt also raise aggregate
liquidity and workers self-insurance opportunities, which substantially strengthens the
direct effect of the cut on the budget set of liquidity-constrained workers.
To obtain further insight into the underlying workings of these effects, we need to go
beyond the reduced-form equations (27)–(28) and look at household-level variables,
which describe how individual consumption (i.e. the private demand side of the
model) and labour supply (the supply side) respond to fiscal shocks. The consumption
of employed workers, ce, is not affected by fiscal shocks. Now, substituting (23) into (19)
we may write ceut as follows:
ceut ¼
Bt1Rt1
1 X þ
Xd
1 X|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
liquidated portfolio
þ d
Rt|{z}
borrowing
 Tt|{z}
taxes
: ð29Þ
The right-hand side of (29) is composed of four terms that all affect the con-
sumption of eu workers. The sum of the first two terms is the total value of their
liquidated portfolio in equilibrium, which depends on how much buffer-stock saving
they were able to form in the previous period (as they were employed); this stock is
affected by the quantity of outside liquidity in the economy (Bt1 in the Bt1Rt1/
(1  X) term) as well as by that of inside liquidity, which depends on constrained
workers pledgeable income d (the Xd/(1  X) term). Besides liquidating their asset
portfolio, eu workers smooth consumption by borrowing (up to the debt limit d/Rt).
Finally, since these workers are borrowing-constrained, higher taxes reduce their
attainable consumption level one for one (the Tt term). As we illustrate below, the
interest rate responds positively to a rise in public debt. This in turn raises the
liquidated value of workers portfolio but also generates some crowding out of private
borrowing; hence, the economy’s response to fiscal shocks will be smaller the higher
is the share of private debt in the total stock of assets (i.e. the higher is d relative to
B). The determinants of uu workers consumption (see (14)) directly follows. Since
they were constrained in the previous period (and hence liquidated their asset
portfolio), they can only raise current consumption above home production by
borrowing (up to d/Rt). However, they must also repay d to their creditors and pay
the lump sum tax Tt.
Turning to the supply side of the model, we can substitute (16) and (23) into (20)–
(21) and write labour supply by employed households as follows:
l eet ¼ ce þ
Bt  Bt1Rt1
1 X þ
Xd
1 X
1
Rt
 1
 
þ Tt ; ð30Þ
l uet ¼ ce þ
Bt
1 Xþ
Xd
ð1 XÞ
1
Rt
þ Tt : ð31Þ
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Equations (30)–(31) show that labour supply responds not only to taxes, as is pre-
dicted by the standard complete-markets model, but also to the stock of liquidity that
households acquire as self-insurance against unemployment risk. ue workers, who have
just moved out of unemployment and have zero beginning-of-period wealth, will seize
any extra opportunity to save by raising labour supply; ee workers, who are partly self-
insured when they enter the current period, adjust their labour supply depending on
the new stock of government and private bonds available for purchase relative to the
current value of their previously accumulated portfolio. In both cases, the growth of
public debt that may result from higher public spending generates liquidity effects that
strengthen the wealth effects on labour supply.
As is shown in Appendix A.2 in Challe and Ragot (2010), under (9)–(10), the
behaviour of the model with liquidity-constrained workers can be approximated by a
two-dimensional dynamic system with endogenous state vector (Rt, Bt). To gain further
insight into these dynamics, and notably about the role of / in determining the stability
of the system, it may be useful to look further into our baseline scenario, in which d ¼ 0
(so that the only source of liquidity in the economy is from government bonds). When
this is the case, the dynamics of the model become univariate and are summarised by
the following linearised debt process (see Appendix A.2 for details):14
Bt ¼ ð1 cÞB þ cBt1 þ lGt þ mGt1 þ lTct þ tTct1; ð32Þ
where Gt and T
c
t are given by (10), c > 0, l, > 0, m < 0 are constants that depend
on the deep parameters of the model and the target debt level B, and where @c/@/
< 0 (i.e. a stronger tax reaction speeds up the reversion of public debt towards
target). Finally, (8) and (27)–(28) give the values of Rt, Ct and Yt as functions of Bt
and Gt.
Since c > 0, stationarity of public debt requires that c < 1. As is shown in Appen-
dix A.2, this condition is equivalent to:
/ > /min 
R  1þ q
1 qX ;with q 
ð1 pebRÞrðceuÞR
1 Xþ XR > 0; ð33Þ
and, where 1  qX > 0 and R > 0, is uniquely defined by the target debt level B.
To illustrate the dynamic impact of liquidity and wealth effects in our economy,
we draw impulse–response functions for all relevant variables using equation (32)
together with (8), (9)–(10) and (27)–(28). Our benchmark (quarterly) parameters are
b ¼ 0.98, pe ¼ 0.95, pu ¼ 0.20 (this generates an unemployment rate of X ’ 5.88%),
d ¼ 0, j ¼ 0.6, w ¼ v ¼ 0.95, the (unique) value of B such that R ¼ 1.01, and
u(c) ¼ ln c.
Figure 1 displays the responses of our variables under study to government
spending and tax cut shocks. Time-series evidence on the dynamic behaviour of
public debt reports a very slow reversion of the debt–GDP ratio towards its long-run
mean (Bohn, 1998; Gali et al., 2007). We take / ¼ 0.2 as our benchmark for the
responsiveness of taxes, which produces such a slow reversion, and we also study the
14 The univariate debt dynamics (32) is obtained by combining the (backward-looking) government
budget constraint (8) and the (forward-looking) Euler equation (26). Both are nonlinear and need to be
linearised to be merged into (32).
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cases in which / ¼ 0.15 and / ¼ 1.2. Unsurprisingly, liquidity effects are stronger
when / ¼ 0.15 and, hence, so are the responses of the aggregates. While setting / ¼
1.2 is clearly unrealistic, it is useful as a counterfactual experiment since, as argued
above, a quick tax reaction and a small increase in public debt takes our economy’s
response to the shocks close to that which would be implied by a baseline RBC
model.
Let us take government spending shocks first. The case in which / ¼ 0.2 illustrates a
situation where liquidity effects dominate wealth effects on total private consumption,
except at the very moment of the shock, due to the substantial increase in public debt
and the implied improvement in households self-insurance opportunities. (Note that
private consumption tracks public debt, and is thus far more persistent than the shock
itself.) As a result, the output effect of a spending shock is large, in the sense that the
spending multiplier is greater than one almost all along the adjustment path. In
contrast, wealth effects dominate when / ¼ 1.2, due to the limited increase in public
debt and the rapid reaction of taxes, resulting in a negative response of private
consumption all along the transition path; in consequence, the government-spending
multiplier is always smaller than one in this case. Holding other parameters constant,
values of / between 0.2 and 1.2 (not represented here) cause private consumption to
start falling below its steady-state level for several periods (during which public debt
and implied liquidity effects are still limited), and then rise above its steady-state level
for the rest of the adjustment period (after public debt has risen enough to make the
liquidity effects prevalent).
Tax cuts also have strong expansionary effects, whether / ¼ 0.15 or 0.2, for two
reasons. First, liquidity-constrained workers consume the tax rebate one for one (see
the Tt part in (29)). Second, the cut raises public debt and hence aggregate liquidity
(the (2  pe)Bt1Rt1 part in (29)). Both channels are much weaker (but still active)
when / ¼ 1.2.
2.4. Sensitivity
Figure 2 shows how changes in some key parameters of the model alter the dynamic
responses of private consumption and output to fiscal shocks. Panel a considers dif-
ferent degrees of risk aversion, with u(c) ¼ c1r/(1  r), r > 0. As discussed above,
the requirement that r  1 is not necessary for our equilibrium to remain well
behaved; we verified numerically that it is so when r ¼ 2 and the other parameters are
at their baseline values. Interestingly, the responses of consumption and output are
larger when risk aversion rises (or, equivalently, when the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) falls). The reason for this is that high risk aversion/low IES make
agents less willing to substitute current consumption for future consumption following
the shock, leading bonds to command a higher return in equilibrium. For a given value
of the tax rule parameter, this stronger reaction of the interest rate induces a larger
response of public debt and hence stronger liquidity effects. Panel b studies the impact
of alternative persistence parameters. Note that in the case of a spending shock, higher
persistence leads to both greater wealth effects (since the present value of total taxes is
higher) and greater liquidity effects (since, for a given tax rule, higher public spending
leads to a stronger debt response to the shock); the first two graphs indicate that
liquidity effects are more affected than wealth effects by an increase in the persistence
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parameter. Panel c relaxes the assumption that the unemployed have no borrowing
capacity. There is now a whole range of pairs (B, d) consistent with both our conjec-
tured equilibrium and the requirement that R ¼ 1.01, of which d ¼ 0 (i.e. our baseline
economy without inside liquidity, the bold line) is one particular instance. Intuitively,
by setting the same value of R for the three specifications we force them to share similar
levels of steady-state aggregate (i.e. inside plus outside) liquidity but allow the compo-
sition of aggregate liquidity to vary across specifications. Panel c shows that raising the
share of private debt in total liquidity weakens the responses of all variables. The reason
for this is the crowding out of private debt by public debt that takes place after either
type of fiscal expansion. Recall that, in the economy without inside liquidity (Figure 1),
these shocks raise the real interest rate. With inside liquidity, this higher rate reduces
unemployed workers ability to borrow (since d/Rt is smaller) and hence their con-
sumption demand moves less than in the baseline economy. Moreover, fewer assets are
issued by the private sector, which reduces households ability to self-insure when
employed.
It may be useful at this stage to compare our results with those in Gali et al. (2007),
who show that a variant of the dynamic New Keynesian model can produce a positive
consumption response to spending shocks. While both models put the emphasis on
liquidity-constrained households and deficit financing, the channels underlying the
procyclicality of consumption differ substantially between the two models. In Gali
et al., both aggregate output and employment are demand-determined, due to sticky
prices and real wage rigidities, and a share of the population is made of hand-to-
mouth workers who consume all of their extra disposable income. Since government
spending raises total demand and output, it raises the wage bill and hence the con-
sumption of these workers one for one; then, private consumption rises if these
workers are in sufficiently large number. By contrast, in the model described above all
prices are fully flexible, so that such (Keynesian) aggregate demand effects are
inoperative; moreover, liquidity-constrained agents are unemployed, which makes
their labour income unresponsive to fiscal shocks. What ultimately matters here for
the procyclical response of private consumption is the ability of these agents to have
built up their precautionary wealth when they were employed, which is in turn determined
by the stock of public debt.
2.5. Imperfectly Elastic Labour Supply and Gradual Asset Accumulation: An Economy with
Partial Risk Sharing
As discussed above, our assumption of linear labour disutility is crucial in generating an
equilibrium with a finite-state, cross-sectional distribution of wealth, for it implies that,
at the individual level, workers leaving unemployment are willing to work as much as
necessary to reach their target level of precautionary wealth instantaneously. However,
this functional form also tends to magnify the aggregate response to fiscal shocks,
relative to an economy with lower labour-supply elasticity. Consider, for example, the
extreme situation in which labour supply would be completely inelastic, so that output
would be entirely unresponsive to fiscal shocks (since labour is the only variable input
here). In this situation, tax cuts would not affect total private consumption or output
(although they could have significant cross-sectional effects). Since spending shocks
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would not affect output either, private consumption would necessarily be crowed out,
rather than crowded in, by public spending. In short, the responses of consumption,
output and other aggregates to fiscal shocks depend crucially on both the size of
liquidity effects and the willingness of private agents to alter their labour supply after
the policy impulse.
To assess the robustness of our results with respect to the elasticity of labour supply,
whilst maintaining both tractability and continuity with our previous analysis, we con-
struct an economy with partial risk sharing that has the property of nesting our baseline
model with liquidity-constrained workers (and no risk sharing at all) as a special case.
For the sake of conciseness, we discuss the implications of this partial risk sharing
arrangement mostly informally here and leave much of the corresponding algebra in
Appendix A.3.
We assume that full risk sharing can take place between employed workers, but only
from the second period of continuous employment onwards. This risk-sharing
arrangement is akin to the family interpretation of the representative agent model
when the underlying agents (i.e. the family members) are heterogenous (e.g., Lucas,
1990; Andolfato, 1996); the difference is that we restrict family membership to a sub-
class of workers, depending on their labour market history: they leave the family when
they fall into employment, taking their fair share of the family’s assets with them, and
re-enter the family when they have been employed for two consecutive periods. All
resources (that is, asset and labour income net of taxes) are pooled within the family.
Under conjectures C1–C2, this simple risk-sharing structure has the following
properties. First, the precautionary saving motive is maintained by the threat of family
exclusion. Second, tractability is maintained (despite the imperfect elasticity of labour
supply) since, even though workers gradually accumulate assets (i.e. those just leaving
unemployment hold less asset than after two employment periods), all family members
have the same consumption and saving rules. Third, the economy becomes exactly
identical to one without risk sharing when labour supply is perfectly elastic. Indeed,
when such is the case, workers leaving unemployment work as much as necessary to
acquire the same asset wealth as that of family members; this in turn implies that risk
sharing within the family becomes redundant (see Appendix A.3 for details). As a
consequence, we can study how changes in the elasticity of labour supply alter the
effectiveness of fiscal policy by continuity with our baseline economy.
We assume the following parametric form for the instant utility function here:
uðcÞ  vðlÞ ¼ ln c  l
1þi
1þ i ; i  0;
and we compare the behaviour of our baseline specification (i.e. i ¼ 0) to one in which
the labour elasticity parameter i takes the higher value of 1, as in Christiano et al.
(2005).
Figure 3 shows the paths of taxes, debt, private consumption, as well as the
components of labour supply, under the same paths for public spending and tax cuts as
in Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, a higher value of i, holding the policy rule parameter /
constant, is associated with a smaller response of aggregates to both public spending
and tax cut shocks (again, recall that under fully inelastic labour supply those shocks
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would not affect output at all). The reason for this is that a value of i higher than zero
makes agents less willing to supply labour to purchase the available stock of liquidity.
Consequently, asset accumulation is gradual (see equations (A.11)–(A.12) in Appen-
dix A.3), and output is less responsive to the shocks. Since the path of government
spending is exogenous, a muted output response implies that a spending shock is more
likely to lead to a crowding out of private consumption (this is notably the case when we
set i ¼ 1 and / ¼ 0.2). Let us note, however, that in this case a strengthening of
liquidity effects may restore crowding in, though later in time (e.g., when i ¼ 1 and
/ ¼ 0.1). To summarise, while output always rises after a spending shock provided that
i < 1, the overall effect of the shock on consumption depends on both the willingness
of workers to supply labour (as indexed i) and on the intensity of liquidity effects (as
determined by the policy rule parameter /). In contrast, tax cut shocks always have
expansionary effects on both output and private consumption (again, as long as
i < 1).
3. Fiscal Policy Shocks with Liquidity-constrained Entrepreneurs
Our analysis has thus far focused on the way in which liquidity effects may affect the
labour supply and consumption demand of private agents. We now wish to study how
the quantity of aggregate liquidity may affect labour demand and the equilibrium real
wage, in addition to determining individual consumption levels. So that the channels
we emphasise will remain transparent, we proceed in three steps. We first derive the
properties and the conditions for existence of the simplest model of entrepreneurial
liquidity demand in Section 3.1; this derivation is done by abstracting from unem-
ployment risk and private debt issuance, and by considering one-period projects (that
is, we set l ¼ s ¼ 1 and d ¼ 0). In Section 3.2 we then characterise the dynamics of
fiscal shocks in this economy and carry out a number of sensitivity checks, notably with
respect to the fiscal policy rule and shocks, as well as the length of project and the
severity of the borrowing constraint. Finally, in Section 3.3, we study the case in which
both liquidity-constrained workers and entrepreneurs interact (i.e. l 2 (0, 1)), so that
the two sources of idiosyncratic risk (unemployment risk and random project oppor-
tunities) determine the economy-wide demand for liquidity.
3.1. Agents Behaviour and Equilibrium
The optimality conditions for entrepreneurs are given by (4)–(6), with fit ¼ 0 8t. For
entrepreneurs currently running a project (i.e. those for whom ni ¼ 1), (4) is inop-
erative (since they do not supply labour), the optimal labour demand (6) applies, and
the optimality condition (5) holds with strict inequality (by conjecture C1). For those
who do not run projects (that is, for whom ni ¼ 0), equation (6) is inoperative (since
they do not demand labour), but (4)–(5) both hold with equality (by conjecture C2).
As in Section 2, an equilibrium with a limited number of household type/asset states
results from conjectures C1–C2 and the assumed utility function (3). For the sake of
conciseness, we simply describe the properties of this equilibrium here and then
establish the sufficient conditions for its existence in Proposition 2 below (see also
Appendix B.1 for details).
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With one period-lived projects (i.e. s ¼ 1), the model generates the following three
types of entrepreneurs: f entrepreneurs who currently run a project but were sup-
plying labour in the previous period; ee entrepreneurs who do not currently run a
project and did not in the previous period either (i.e. they have been supplying labour
in both periods) and fe entrepreneurs who are currently employed after having run a
project in the previous period. By conjecture C2, entrepreneurs who do not run a
project are not borrowing-constrained, which under the utility function (3) implies that
they all choose the same consumption and asset holding levels, denoted by ~cet and ~a
e
t
(note that ~cet will be time-varying, due to changes in the real wage). By conjecture C1,
entrepreneurs who do run a project are borrowing-constrained and we denote their
consumption and labour demands by c ft and l
f
t . The budget constraints of each type of
entrepreneur are:
ee : ~cet þ ~aet ¼ ~aet1Rt1 þ wt ~l eet  Tt ; ð34Þ
fe : ~cet þ ~aet ¼ wt l fet þ l ft1  Tt  d; ð35Þ
f : c
f
t þ wt l ft ¼ ~aet1Rt1  Tt þ d=Rt : ð36Þ
Equation (34) is the same as (21), except for the fact that the consumption of
entrepreneurs who do not run a project, ~cet ; is now time-varying (due to time-variations
in the equilibrium wage). In (35), fe entrepreneurs earn the labour income wtl
fe
t plus
production output yt ¼ l ft1; and this total income is used to pay for consumption, ~cet ;
asset accumulation, ~aet , taxes , Tt, and the repayment of their debt obligations, d.
Equation (36), the budget constraint of entrepreneurs running a project, states that
they liquidate their (beginning-of-period) assets, ~aet1Rt1, entirely and borrow up to
the borrowing limit d/Rt, in order to finance current consumption, c
f
t ; taxes, Tt and the
wage, bill, wtl
f
t .
Finally, we denote by ~xee , C and ~xfe the asymptotic shares of entrepreneurs of type
ee, f and fe, respectively, which are assumed to prevail from date 0 onwards (note
that by construction C is also the number of projects being run in the economy).
Given the transitions of entrepreneurs among individual states, these shares are
given by:
~xee ¼ h=ð2 hÞ; C ¼ ~x fe ¼ ð1 hÞ=ð2 hÞ: ð37Þ
From (4) to (5) and (34) to (36), the intratemporal and intertemporal optimality
conditions for entrepreneurs not currently running a project but supplying labour to
the market are:
wtu
0ð~cet Þ ¼ 1; ð38Þ
u0ð~cet Þ ¼ bRtEt ½hu0ð~cetþ1Þ þ ð1 hÞu0ðcftþ1Þ: ð39Þ
From (36), entrepreneurs who run a project allocate their after-tax resources,
~aet1Rt1  Tt þ d=Rt , to current consumption, c ft and the wage bill, wt l ft , taking the
real wage as given. From (6) and (36), together with the fact that these entrepreneurs
exit active entrepreneurship after one period, the solution to their optimal labour
demand, l
f
t , satisfies:
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wtu
0ðcft Þ ¼ bEtu0ð~cet Þ: ð40Þ
The optimality condition (40) simply sets the utility fall implied by a decrease in
current consumption necessary to hire an extra unit of labour equal to the utility gain
that is expected from increasing current labour input (and thus future production) by
that unit.
Given that entrepreneurs running a project are in proportion C, clearing of the
bond, labour and goods markets now requires:
ð1 CÞ~aet  Cd=Rt ¼ Bt ; ð41Þ
ð1 2CÞ~l eet þ Cl fet ¼ Cl ft ; ð42Þ
ð1 CÞ~cet þ Cc ft þ Gt ¼ Cyt : ð43Þ
Equation (41) is similar to (23). Equation (42) is like (24), except for the fact that
total labour demand, Lt ¼ Cl ft , now emanates from the entrepreneurial sector. In
(43), yt is output per entrepreneur and thus Yt ¼ Cyt is total output. Finally, the gov-
ernment’s behaviour is described by the budget constraint (8), together with our fiscal
rule and shock processes (9)–(10), where again /must be large enough for public debt
to be stationary. Proposition 2, whose proof is found in Appendix B.1, parallels
Proposition 1 by stating the conditions under which our limited-heterogeneity entre-
preneurial equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. Assume that
(i) r(c)  1,
(ii) fluctuations of Bt around B are small and
(iii) (B, d) jointly satisfy:
0 < B þ bd < ~R  b
2
bþ 1 hþ
b
1 h
 
u01ðb1Þ:
Then, the equilibrium with three types of entrepreneurs exists and has an interest rate Rt strictly
lower than 1/b for all t.
Just as in the case of liquidity-constrained workers, the existence of a limited-
heterogeneity equilibrium with liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs relies on steady-
state public debt being sufficiently low. Importantly, here again the requirement
that r(c)  1 is meant to guarantee steady-state uniqueness for all possible parameter
configurations but one can easily construct economies where r > 1 and verify
numerically that uniqueness still prevails.
Entrepreneurs who encounter a project opportunity play a central role in our analysis,
so it may be instructive to decompose their budget set in equilibrium as we did earlier for
workers falling into unemployment (see (29)). Substituting (41) into (36), we obtain:
c
f
t|{z}
consumption
þ wtl ft|ﬄ{zﬄ}
wage bill
¼ Bt1Rt1
1 C þ
Cd
1 C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
liquidated portfolio
þ d
Rt|{z}
borrowing
 Tt|{z}
taxes
:
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In short, these entrepreneurs allocate their after-tax resources between current
consumption and the wage bill, with the optimal trade-off between the two charac-
terised by equation (40). These resources consist of their liquidated asset portfolio,
whose value depends on the stocks of outside and inside liquidity available in the
economy (and hence on Bt1 and d), as well as the corporate debt they are able to issue
(up to d/Rt), minus taxes.
3.2. The Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Shocks
The dynamic system characterising the entrepreneurial model involves more lags and
more interactions between variables than the basic model (the equations forming this
dynamic system are described in Appendix B.1). For the sake of comparability, we run
policy experiments with exactly the same parameter values as in the previous Section,
except for h, which is now set to 0.80 (implying a share of entrepreneurs of
C’16.67%).15 As is summarised in Appendix B.2, the dynamics of the entrepreneurial
model yield an expectational dynamic system that can be solved numerically for the
vector of relevant variables and for the stationarity condition.
Figure 4 displays the responses of fiscal and aggregate variables to either type of fiscal
shock generated by our baseline entrepreneurial model. (Note that ~cet and l
f
t , although
not represented, are tracked by wt and Ytþ1, respectively.) Let us start with government
spending shocks again. Since liquidity effects on labour demand take one period to be
operative (as some employed households having increased their savings turn into
entrepreneurs), wealth effects on labour supply dominate on impact for all values of /.
The ensuing increase in labour supply leads to a sharp fall in the real wage and the
consumption of employed households, causing total private consumption to fall.
However, when (/ ¼ 0.2) liquidity effects on labour demand become dominant (in the
sense of leading to higher-than-steady-state wages) for the entire adjustment path
starting from one period after the shock, leading to a persistent boom in private
consumption. While these positive wage and private consumption responses are mag-
nified when (/ ¼ 0.15), they are inverted when (/ ¼ 1.2). In this latter case, the strong
reaction of taxes and limited growth of public both act to weaken the liquidity effects
on labour demand whilst strengthening wealth effects on labour supply. This leads to a
limited increase in labour demand relative to the contemporaneous increase in labour
supply, and thus to a fall in the real wage and a crowding-out of private consumption by
public spending. Here again, values of / between 0.2 and 1.2 (not represented here)
generate a more mixed picture with dominance of either effect at different points on
the transition path.
The response of private consumption to tax cut shocks looks qualitatively similar to
that generated by the model with liquidity-constrained households, but labour market
adjustments play a central role here. More specifically, a tax cut loosens the borrowing
constraint of entrepreneurs, (36), both directly through its effect on Tt and indirectly
through its effect on at1Rt1. This in turn contributes to raise both entrepreneurs
15 This value is roughly equal to the number of US firms, from The Census Bureau’s 2002 Survey of
Business Owners (23 million firms) divided by total employment by the end of the same year from the BLS
Current Population Survey (136.5 million people).
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consumption, c
f
t and their labour demand, l
f
t . This higher labour demand then raises
the equilibrium real wage and hence the consumption of employed households, ~cet
(see (38)). Unsurprisingly, these effects are larger the smaller is the policy respon-
siveness parameter.
3.2.1. Sensitivity
Figure 5 shows how modifying either risk aversion or shock persistence alters impulse-
response functions. As in the model with liquidity-constrained consumers, a higher
degree of risk aversion tends to magnify liquidity effects (see Panel a), since it triggers a
larger reaction of the equilibrium real interest rate and thus of the stock of public debt.
Note, however, that with r ¼ 0.5 and after a spending shock liquidity effects on labour
demand are so weak that they are dominated by wealth effects on labour supply over
much of the adjustment path; consequently, both the real wage and private con-
sumption lie below their steady-state value most of the time (first row of Panel a). The
conflict between wealth and liquidity effects is even more apparent when one looks at
the effect of changing the persistence of spending shocks (first row of Panel b). On the
one hand, such shocks imply that taxes are higher than their steady-state value for a
sustained amount of time, which leads to a prolonged increase in labour supply. On the
other hand, these shocks raise public debt and hence the labour demand of entre-
preneurs. Since raising the persistence of the shock strengthens both effects, the way it
will affect the equilibrium real wage and private consumption at different point of the
adjustment path is a priori ambiguous. In the case of tax cut shocks (second row of
Panel b), lower taxes and higher liquidity both contribute to generate a short-run boom
in the real wage and private consumption.
Figure 6 compares our baseline entrepreneurial model (in which d ¼ 0) with one
with both inside and outside liquidity (i.e. d > 0), and imposes the unique value of B
that generates a B/Y ratio of 8/3 for the latter (since R, and thus Y, are interpreted as
quarterly values, the corresponding yearly debt–output ratio would be 2/3); given our
requirement that the steady-state gross interest rate be 1.01, this uniquely pins down d.
Again, a higher share of private debt turns out to weaken the responses of all variables,
due to the interest rate increase that follows fiscal shocks. More specifically, in the
economy with inside liquidity, this higher rate reduces entrepreneurs ability to borrow
(since d/Rt is smaller), and hence their consumption and labour demand move less
than in the baseline economy; this in turn translates into a smaller reaction of the real
wage and thus a muted increase in entrepreneurs consumption. The impact of this
crowding out on total output naturally follows. Of course, we should expect a similar
crowding out of private demand to take place if we were to introduce other assets into
the economy, such as claims on the capital stock. In the latter case, the higher interest
rate induced by fiscal expansions would deter investment demand and thus tune down
the economy’s reaction to fiscal shocks; see Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), for an
analysis of this crowding out in the steady state. Here again, which channel is likely to
dominate ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the crowding-in and crowd-
ing-out effects on private demand.
In Figure 7, we consider the case in which entrepreneurial projects last for
more than one period (see Appendix B.3 for details). To understand how this modifies
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the responses to fiscal shocks, take the simple example where s ¼ 2. Entrepreneurs
running a project in the current period now comprise two types of entrepreneurs in
equal numbers: those who start a project in the current period and those whose project
started in the previous period and are still ongoing. Importantly, both are borrowing-
constrained provided that wtRt < 1 (see our discussion of condition (7)). Extending
the project length has two conflicting effects here. One the one hand, debt-financed
fiscal shocks increase the stock of liquidity in the economy. This increased liquidity
relaxes the borrowing constraint of entrepreneurs who encounter a project opportu-
nity and boosts their labour demand. Hence, they will produce more output in the next
period, which will again enable them to raise their labour demand in the next period
too and to produce more output two periods ahead. Thus, long-lived projects generate
intertemporal spillovers of fiscal-policy shocks. On the other hand, if we maintain, as we
do, the share of active entrepreneurs at the same value as in the baseline model (about
17%), the probability of meeting an investment opportunity, (1  h), must be smaller
(0.1 instead of 0.2); this tends to reduce the immediate impact of liquidity shocks. As
shown in Figure 7 this latter effect slightly dominates the former under our parame-
terisation. Note, however, that this dominance is small, in the sense that the overall
impact of fiscal shocks is primarily dominated by the fiscal rule rather than by the
length of projects (at least for the lengths that we are considering). For example, if we
set u ¼ 0.1, a value that still generates a plausible debt response to the shocks, then
liquidity effects remain largely dominant even with s ¼ 4. We may thus conclude that
our basic qualitative results about the expansionary effects of fiscal shocks are robust to
the inclusion of long projects.
3.3. The Economy with Constrained Workers and Entrepreneurs
Having disentangled how the liquidity effects induced by rising public debt affect
liquidity-constrained workers (who self-insure against unemployment risk) and
liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs (who hoard wealth to finance stochastic project
opportunities), it is now straightforward to consider the more general and realistic case
in which households of both occupations interact, that is, l 2 (0,1).
The budget constraints and optimality conditions for entrepreneurs are given by
(34)–(40), as before. The budget constraints for workers are still given by (14) and
(19)–(21), but their optimality conditions must be modified slightly to account for the
fact that they face a potentially time-varying wage payment in the labour market.
The first thing to note is that the optimal consumption level of employed workers is
no longer given by (16), but by (38) instead, and is thus equal to that of entrepreneurs
not currently running an investment project. This in turn implies that their optimal
asset demand is now given by:
u0ð~cet Þ ¼ bpeRtEtu0ð~cet Þ þ bð1 peÞRtEtu0ðaet Rt  Ttþ1Þ: ð44Þ
The market-clearing conditions must be modified to account for the interactions of
all types of agents in the economy. For example, equilibrium in the bonds market now
requires:
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ð1 lÞðxee þ xueÞaet þ lð~xee þ ~xfeÞ~aet ¼ Bt ; ð45Þ
where the xs are those in (22) and (37) above.
The first part in the right-hand side of (45) is the total asset demand emanating from
employed workers, which is in turn given by their total mass in the population
(1l)(xee þ xue) times their (common) individual asset demand aet , with the latter
given by (44). The second part of the equation is the total liquidity demand by
entrepreneurs contemplating the possibility of having an investment opportunity in the
next period; those are in numbers lð~xee þ ~xueÞ in the population, while each of them
hoards a quantity ~aet of liquidity (with ~a
e
t being determined by (39)). With d ¼ 0, the
right-hand side of the inequality, Bt, is the aggregate supply of liquidity in the economy
(as before, setting d > 0 would lower the impact of fiscal shocks but would not alter our
results qualitatively).
Similarly, the equilibrium condition in the market for goods is now given by:
½ð1 lÞðxee þ xueÞ þ lð~xee þ ~xfeÞ~cet
þ ð1 lÞxue ceut þ ð1 lÞxuucuut þ lCc ft þ Gt ¼ lCl ft1:
ð46Þ
Take the right-hand side of (46) and recall that ~cet is now the consumption level of
both employed workers and entrepreneurs waiting for a project opportunity; again, the
former and the latter are (1l)(xee þ xue) and lð~xee þ ~x feÞ in the population,
respectively. The other relevant consumption levels (i.e. ceut , c
uu
t and c
f
t ) are similarly
weighted by their respective population shares. As in our baseline economy, total
output is produced by those who encountered a project opportunity in the last period
(because of the production lag); those demanded a quantity of labour l
f
t1, and are now
in number lC in the population. Finally, equilibrium in the labour market requires:
ð1 lÞðxee l eet þ xue luet Þ þ lð~xee ~l eet þ ~x fe l fet Þ ¼ lCl ft : ð47Þ
Figure 8 illustrates the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks for several values of the share
of entrepreneurs in the economy. Our calibration strategy here is as follows: given the
coexistence of workers and entrepreneurs, we adjust the probabilities of changing
status, (1pe) and (1h), in such a way that the unemployment and active entrepre-
neurship rates in the population, here (1l)X and lC, take the same values as in the
basic scenarios of Sections 2 and 3, namely 5.88% and 16.67% (the transition proba-
bility pu is left at 0.20 but adjusting it within realistic bounds jointly with pe only changes
the IRFs marginally). Then, the requirements that pe, h > 0 impose bounds on l, given
our chosen values of (1l)X and lC; here it implies that we must have
0.33 < l < 0.89.
The fact that we cannot continuously move from l ¼ 1, in which case the value of
pe is irrelevant, to a value of l consistent with pe > 0 implies that the dynamic effects of
fiscal shocks evolve substantially across the two specifications. In particular, the econ-
omy with both workers and entrepreneurs displays a stronger and more persistent
reaction of public debt to both kinds of fiscal policy shocks, and hence stronger
liquidity effects on all aggregates (this arises because the interest rate interest rate
response to the shock is substantially stronger when 0.33 < l < 0.89 than when l ¼ 1,
and hence by (8) public debt rises more and more persistently in the former case than
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in the latter). In this context, values of / below / ¼ 0.25 generate either a highly (and
unrealistically) persistent public debt response to the shocks, or even lack of
stationarity; we thus impose (/ ¼ 0.25) here. Aside from this required fiscal-rule
adjustment, the economy with both types of households inherits the salient qualitative
features of the two basic specifications (i.e. l ¼ 0 and l ¼ 1). In particular, private
consumption and the real wage start falling below steady state before rising above it in a
hump-shaped manner after a spending shock (this is because wealth effects are set in
motion before liquidity effects here), while tax cuts are expansionary all along the
transition path.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have presented the predictions of a tractable liquidity-constrained
economy regarding the effects of debt-financed fiscal expansions, with particular atten-
tion being paid to the effects of spending shocks on private consumption and the real
wage. Ourmain goal has been to illustrate that the liquidity effects induced by temporary
changes in the stock of public debt can drastically alter the predictions of the baseline
complete-markets model, in which changes in public spending affect aggregates only
through intertemporal wealth effects. To summarise, our main results are as follows:
First, debt-financed increases in public spending generate potentially powerful
liquidity effects when agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty. This
effect occurs because aggregate liquidity facilitates self-insurance by house-
holds facing unemployment risk, while at the same time helping potential
entrepreneurs to hoard asset wealth for future investment needs. As a result,
such policies may have strong expansionary effects on private consumption,
labour demand and the equilibrium real wage.
Second, both spending shocks and tax cuts have stronger effects on macro-
economic aggregates when the response of taxes necessary to ensure the
solvency of the government is delayed. This property arises because the extent
of liquidity effects is indexed by the aggregate supply of assets in the econ-
omy. The latter is directly affected by the dynamics of public debt, and hence
by the tax rule adopted by the government.
Third, fiscal expansions are more effective the tighter the borrowing con-
straints faced by private agents. Tight borrowing constraints make agents
highly dependent on government-issued assets to self-insure against idiosyn-
cratic income risk. In contrast, looser constraints reduce their dependence,
while at the same time crowding out private asset issuances when borrowing
limits are interest-rate dependent.
Our model relied on two assumptions that we are planning to dispose of in future
research. First, we abstracted from capital accumulation. As discussed above, when
public debt and capital are substitutes as outside liquidity instruments then debt-
financed fiscal shocks are bound to crowd out private investment demand and thus to
reduce the impact of fiscal shocks; further investigation is thus needed to assess the
extent of this crowding out and how it would affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
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Second, we have assumed throughout that there was no distortionary cost associated
with high levels of government debt, so that raising liquidity supply could only be
beneficial in the liquidity-constrained equilibrium; again, incorporating such distor-
tions is likely to qualify (but also enrich) our results on the dynamic effects of fiscal
shocks. More generally, the relative tractability of our model may make it useful for
understanding more complicated fiscal-policy issues such as the international trans-
mission of fiscal shocks. In particular, it has been argued that scarce world liquidity and
heterogenous financial development are crucial in determining the direction and size
of international capital flows (Caballero et al., 2008). In as much as domestic public
debt provides liquidity to foreign savers, our framework may offer new insights into how
fiscal shocks are transmitted across financially integrated economies.
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